Unlike other former Soviet republics with frozen conflicts (Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova), Azerbaijan has not been an enemy state for Russia. It has never had a government that turned anti-Russian rhetoric into a key foreign policy commodity, or proclaimed emancipation from Russia its main aim.  
 
Azerbaijan got rid of its Lenin statues and street names honoring Soviet leaders long ago, but it didn’t turn that process into a spectacle aimed at offending Moscow. Ever since the Soviet collapse, Azerbaijan has developed a multidirectional foreign policy built around the principle that its ties with Moscow won’t disappear, but will become weaker, and that it should move closer to the West, especially since Baku always suspected the Yeltsin government of harboring pro-Armenian sympathies. A common local interpretation of the first war in Karabakh is that Azerbaijan lost not to the Armenians but to Russia.  
 
For Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is highly focused on Russia’s role in World War II, it’s important that Azerbaijan’s official view of the war mostly coincides with Russia’s, and that war heroes are praised, and Victory Day celebrated on May 9. In the modern Azerbaijani national narrative, Russia is not blamed for all the problems of the past and present, and 200 years of coexistence with Russia in one state is described as having its positive aspects too.  
 
Azerbaijan has cooperated with NATO and provided symbolic contingents of its troops to NATO operations, but it has never voiced any official ambition to join the alliance. Among the former Soviet states, Azerbaijan has always been an example of how to follow a foreign policy that is entirely independent from Russia, while maintaining a good relationship with Moscow and Putin. This example is also important for Russia itself, as it shows that good relations with Moscow don’t have to come at the cost of submission or signing up for Russia-led integration projects, and independence from Moscow doesn’t necessarily entail falling out with Russia or a demonstrative rapprochement with its enemies.  

Worse still, Pashinyan welcomes the activity of Western NGOs, including those funded by the U.S. philanthropist George Soros, who has been accused by ultraconservatives of financing color revolutions. As far as the Kremlin is concerned, allowing these NGOs to operate freely is nothing short of a security breach. The current Armenian government’s second deadly sin in the eyes of the Kremlin is the prosecution of former president Robert Kocharyan.
 
Russia’s reticence where Armenia is concerned is also linked to the fact that, regardless of Putin’s role, Russian diplomats—both in the 1990s and now—feel that Yerevan wasted time when it could have resolved its territorial dispute peacefully. Moscow understands that the military victory of Armenia, a small and poor country, over richer and more populous Azerbaijan was down to chance as much as anything else.  
 
Russia discussed a possible solution with Armenia that would entail Armenia gaining legal recognition of most of Karabakh in exchange for giving up some of the territories that it won during the war. But the democratic nature of the Armenian government prevented it from making the compromise. Any concession on the issue of Karabakh threatens to bring down the Armenian leadership.

Russia’s partnership with Turkey, despite its tensions and periodic clashes, allows Russia to remain in Syria and go about its business in Libya without sustaining major losses. But most importantly, it helps to create a situation in which regional conflicts can be solved without U.S. involvement—something Russia values highly. Squeezing the United States out of regional conflicts is more important for Russia than stopping other regional powers from gaining a bigger role in them.
 
Being free to act without Western interference is also important for Turkey, and for this reason, it is reconciled to Russia’s presence in conflicts that Ankara considers important. Putin and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan are united by their joint resistance to the West and their shared ambition of a greater role in global affairs. This anti-Western platform is more important than the shared Christian platform on which Armenia is pinning its hopes.